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Abstract Currently all countries including developing countries are expected
to utilize their own tax revenues and carry out their own development for
solving poverty in their countries. However, developing countries cannot earn
tax revenues like developed countries partly because they do not have effective
countermeasures against international tax avoidance. Our analysis focuses on
treaty shopping among various ways to conduct international tax avoidance be-
cause tax revenues of developing countries have been heavily damaged through
treaty shopping. To analyze the location and sector of conduit firms likely to be
used for treaty shopping, we constructed a multilayer ownership-tax network
and proposed multilayer centrality. Because multilayer centrality can consider
not only the value flowing in the ownership network but also the withholding
tax rate, it is expected to grasp precisely the locations and sectors of conduit
firms established for the purpose of treaty shopping. Our analysis shows that
firms in the sectors of Finance & Insurance and Wholesale & Retail trade etc.
are involved with treaty shopping. We suggest that developing countries make
a clause focusing on these sectors in the tax treaties they conclude.
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1 Introduction
About 800 million people worldwide still cannot enjoy food, safe drinking wa-
ter, and clean sanitation. The United Nations has established the Sustainable
Development Goals (abbreviated as SDGs) with poverty as its first target. I
order to provide public services required to solve poverty, such as health, edu-
cation, and social security, each developing country needs funding equivalent
to 4% of their Gross Domestic Product (abbreviated as GDP) (UN 2005). So
far, such funding has mostly relied on developed countries. Recently, however,
it has been emphasized that it is important for developing countries to pro-
cure such funds by themselves (G20 2010). It has been confirmed again in
the implementation of SDGs (UN 2015) and it is set as SDG 17.1 to develop
the taxing capabilities of developing countries. To reduce poverty, developing
countries are expected to increase their tax revenue.
However, developing countries’ ability to raise tax revenues is still lower
than that of developed countries. While developed countries earn more than
30% tax on their GDP, many developing countries do not reach as much as
20% except some Asian and Latin American countries. In particular, for more
than half of sub-Saharan African countries, it is less than 15% (UNDP 2010).
The reason why developing countries cannot earn enough tax revenue for the
scale of their economies is mainly due to a lack of tax collection capacity (Gor-
don and Li 2009) and international tax avoidance. In particular, low-income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and South
Asia have lost much of their tax revenues due to international tax avoidance
(Cobham and Jansky 2017). Compared with developed countries, developing
countries are more vulnerable to international tax avoidance because many
developing countries do not have effective policies to prevent international tax
avoidance (OECD 2014). It is needed now to craft an effective policy toward
international tax avoidance for developing countries to earn adequate tax rev-
enues.
We focused on treaty shopping among various ways to avoid taxes. Treaty
shopping is a scheme to avoid withholding tax. When a firm pays its dividends
to a firm in another jurisdiction, withholding tax is usually imposed on the
dividends. The withholding tax is sometimes reduced or exempted when the
payment is conducted between jurisdictions contracted in a tax treaty. Treaty
shopping occurs when a firm in a third jurisdictions and not eligible to receive
the reduction or exemption tries to establish a so-called paper company in tje
contracting jurisdiction in order to enjoy the reductions or exemptions. Many
developing countries have reported huge losses in their tax revenue as a result
of treaty shopping (OECD 2014). Our analysis deals with treaty shopping,
which heavely damages developing countries by loss of their tax revenues.
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Recently, network science has attracted attention because network theory
has succeeded in highlighting emergent phenomena called ”complex systems,”
which describes economic phenomena with a graph consisting of nodes and
links (Barabasi 2016). However, actual economic phenomena often have to
consider multiple layers, as a result, research on multilayer networks has pro-
gressed (Kivela et al. 2014). Multilayer networks consist of layers in which the
nodes of one layer are connected to nodes in another.
There have been only a few previous studies on treaty shopping. Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2008) and Weyzig (2013) investigated treaty shopping taking
into account both the profits and the withholding tax rates, but their target
is only specific countries (Germany and The Netherlands). Garcia-Bernardo
et al. (2017) investigate treaty shopping by focusing the profits (value) in the
world and Van’t Riet and Lejour (2018) focuses on the withholding tax rates
of 108 jurisdictions. While Van’t Riet et al. (2015) examined the relationship
between treaty shopping and dividends, Hong (2018) and Petkova et al. (2018)
studied the effects of double tax treaties on foreign direct Investment. There
are no studies to analyze treaty shopping taking both profits and withhold-
ing tax rates worldwide. In addition, unlike other methods of international
tax avoidance (Acciari et al. 2015), there are no studies to investigate treaty
shopping from the point of view of sectors. This is the first study to analyze
treaty shopping from the perspective of sectors, while taking into account both
profits (values) and the withholding tax rate worldwide.
We construct and analyze a multilayer network consisting of an ownership
network and a withholding tax network. There are three features of our analy-
sis. The first point is the use of micro data to record firm information all over
the world. The second point is that we analyze treaty shopping by focusing on
sectors for the first time. Third, the multilayer centrality we propose makes
it possible to analyze treaty shopping more precisely by considering both the
profit (value) and the withholding tax rate.
Section 2 describes the multilayer network we construct and explains mul-
tilayer centrality, which we propose for analyzing the locations and sectors
of firms used for treaty shopping. Section 3 outlines the data used to build
the multilayer network. Section 4 describes the results obtained by applying
our multilayer centrality to the multilayer network and considers effective tax
policies to prevent treaty shopping. Section 5 summarizes our study.
2 Method
Although countermeasures against some international tax avoidance methods
have already focused on specific sectors, countermeasures against treaty shop-
ping have not focused on the sectors. We supposed that there are some sectors
that are easy to exploit for treaty shopping like other tax avoidance methods
and examined the locations and the sectors of conduit firms used in treaty
shopping. The concept of ”value” is used for our analysis because its effective-
ness has been confirmed in previous research (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2017).
4 Tembo Nakamoto et al.
However, the purpose for which conduit firms are established is not limited to
the use of treaty shopping. To limit our analysis to conduit firms for treaty
shopping, we also considered withholding tax rates imposed on dividends. One
of the main motivations to do treaty shopping is to recommend withholding
tax rates. We propose multilayer centrality as means to analyze the conduit
firms used in treaty shopping while taking into account both the value intensity
and the withholding tax rates.
2.1 Multilayer ownership-tax network
The multilayer ownership-tax network is defined as M = (g, l), where g =
{Gα, Gβ} is a set of weighted directed graphs (called layers of M) and l ∈ Lαβ
is a set of interlayer connections. Figure 1 shows an image of the network M .
The first layer of M , defined as Gα = (Nα, Lα,Wα, Pα), is the ownership net-
work, where Nα is a set of nodes (firms), Lα is a set of links (shareholding
relationships) between pairs of nodes, Wα is the link value function (share-
holding ratios), and Pα is the node value function (operating incomes). The
links are directed, going from a shareholder firm to an owned firm. The second
layer of M , defined as Gβ = (Nβ , Lβ ,Wβ), is the withholding tax network,
where Nβ is a set of nodes (jurisdictions), Lβ is a set of links (direction to pay
dividends) between pairs of nodes, and Wβ is the link value function (with-
holding tax rates imposed on dividends. A node (firm) nα of the layer Gα is
connected with that (jurisdiction) nβ of the layer Gβ according to the location
of nα by Lαβ .
Withholding Tax Network
Ownership Network
Fig. 1 Image of the multilayer ownership-tax network.
2.2 Value intensity
The firms used for tax purposes are divided into ”sink” and ”conduit” accord-
ing to their functions (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2017). We analyze the conduit
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firms used for treaty shopping by focusing on value intensity. The sink firms
have to be identified for analyzing the conduit firms because of the conduit
firms’ definition. Therefore, we first identify the locations and sectors of firms
functioning as a ”sink” and then analyze the locations and sectors of firms
functioning as a ”conduit.”
2.2.1 Value
To identify the sink and the conduit, we use the value flowing in the ownership
network. The value is defined as follows (Vitali et al. 2012):
vni+1 = pk
l−1∏
i=1
wnini+1 (1)
Here, pk is an operating income of a firm k located at the end of chains in the
ownership network and wnini+1 is the shareholding ratio from a shareholder
firm ni+1 to an owned firm ni. The value vn(i+1) enters a firm ni+1 and the
value vn(i+2) leaves firm ni+1.
The locations and sectors of firms are expressed by jurisdiction × sector
pairs. For example, The Netherlands × Finance & Insurance indicates a set
of firms located in The Netherlands whose sector is financial and insurance
activities.
2.2.2 Sink
Figure 2 shows the concept of a ”sink.” We supposed that a jurisdiction ×
sector pair functioning as a ”sink” has much more value compared with its
economic scale.
Sink
value
capital
Other jurisdicons Other jurisdicons
value
capital
Fig. 2 Sink concept: more value enters jurisdictions × sector pairs functioning as a sink
and less value leaves the pair.
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The sink centrality Sjs of jurisdiction j × sector s pair is defined as follows.
At first, take the difference between the value entering and the value leaving
firms whose location is j and sector is s to calculate the value of the pair. Next,
this is divided by the total value flowing in the ownership network to calculate
the value intensity of the pair. Finally, it is normalized by jurisdiction GDP
to compare the value intensity with its economic scale:
Sjs =
∑
V injs −
∑
V outjs
V total
·
∑
iGDPi
GDPj
(2)
Here,
∑
V injs is the sum of the values entering the firms whose location is j and
sector is s,
∑
V outjs is the sum of the values leaving the firms whose location is j
and sector is s, V total is the total amount of the value flowing in the ownership
network, and GDPj is the GDP of jurisdiction j. We suppose that the GDP
of each jurisdiction represents its economic scale.
2.2.3 Conduit
A conduit is like a tunnel through which value enters or leaves a sink. We
consider that much more value entering the sink or leaving the sink passes
through jurisdiction × sector pairs functioning as a conduit compared with
its economic scale. Because the conduit plays a key role in treaty shopping,
we analyze the location and sectors of firms functioning as conduits. For the
analysis, we define a conduit centrality cjs of jurisdiction j × sector s that
consists of conduit outward centrality coutjs and conduit inward centrality c
in
js.
Figure 3 shows the concept of a conduit. The conduit outward centrality coutjs
measures the value entering the sink through firms whose location is j and
sector is s while the conduit inward centrality coutjs measures the value leaving
the sink through firms whose location is j and sector is s.
Sink
Other jurisdicons
Conduit
Outward
value
capital
value Conduit
Inward
capital
Fig. 3 Conduit concept: value enters into ”sink” through ”conduit outward” and leaves
”sink” through ”conduit inward.”
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The conduit outward centrality coutjs of jurisdiction j × sector s is defined as
follows. At first, it measures the values passing through firms whose location is
j and sector is s and entering the sink. Next, it is divided by the total amount
of values flowing in the ownership network Gα to calculate the value intensity.
Lastly, it is normalized by jurisdiction GDP to compare the passing value with
its economic scale.
coutjs =
V sinkout
Vtotal
·
∑
iGDPi
GDPj
(3)
Here, V sinkout is the sum of the value passing through the firms whose location is
j and sector is s and entering the sinks, Vtotal is the total amount of the value
flowing in the ownership network Gα, and GDPj is the GDP of jurisdiction j
representing its economic scale.
The conduit outward centrality coutjs is standardized so that its average
value and standard deviation is 1.0 because of the calculation of the multilayer
centrality described in Sect. 2.4:
Coutjs =
coutjs − coutjs
σcout
js
+ 1 (4)
Here, coutjs is the average of all conduit outward centrality c
out
js and σcoutjs is
the standard deviation of all conduit outward centrality coutjs . Therefore, if the
standardized conduit outward centrality Coutjs of a jurisdiction j × sector s
pare is above 1.0, then it can be said that the value to sink has passed through
the jurisdiction j × sector s pare while much considering its economic scale
compared with other pairs.
On the other hand, the conduit inward centrality cinjs of jurisdiction j ×
sector s is defined as follows. At first, it measures the values leaving from the
sink and passing through the firms whose location is j and sector is s. Next,
it is divided by the total amount of values flowing in the ownership network
Gα. Lastly, it is normalized by jurisdiction GDP to compare the passing value
with its economic scale:
cinjs =
V sinkin
Vtotal
·
∑
iGDPi
GDPj
(5)
Here,
∑
Vg is the sum of the value from sink through firms whose location is
jurisdiction j and sector s,
∑
Vg is the total amount of the values flowing in the
ownership network Gα, and GDPj is the GDP of jurisdiction j representing
its economic scale.
The conduit inward centrality cinjs is standardized so that its average value
and standard deviation is 1.0 because of the calculation of the multilayer
centrality described in Sect. 2.4:
Cinjs =
cinjs − cinjs
σcin
js
+ 1 (6)
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Here, cinjs is the average of all conduit inward centrality c
in
js and σcinjs is the
standard deviation of all conduit inward centrality cinjs. Therefore, if the stan-
dardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs of a jurisdiction j × sector s pare is
above 1.0, then it can be said that the value from the sink has passed through
the jurisdiction j × sector s pare while considering its economic scale compared
to other pairs.
To make it easy to compare between jurisdiction × sector pairs, the Eu-
clidean distance between the standardized conduit outward centrality Coutjs and
the standardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs is calculated. The distance is
adjusted to 1.0 when the standardized conduit outward centrality Coutjs and
the standardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs are both 1.0:
Cjs =
√
(Cinjs )
2 + (Coutjs )
2/
√
2 (7)
2.3 Withholding tax rate
Conduit firms are established for a variety of tax reasons. The purpose of
our analysis is to analyze the conduit firms established for treaty shopping.
Therefore, we focused on the withholding tax imposed on dividends, which
is one of the most important factors in conducting treaty shopping (Weyzig
2013). We regard conduit firms located in jurisdictions highly attractive to
treaty shopping from the point of the withholding tax rates as the conduit
firms used for treaty shopping.
We used load centrality lj to measure the attraction of treaty shopping
quantitatively. Load centrality lj is the total amount of the packet passing
through a node when all pairs of nodes send and receive a data packet between
them (Goh et al. 2001; Brandes 2008). We think of a node as a jurisdiction,
a data packet as a dividend, put the withholding tax rates as the weight, and
calculate the load centrality lj (Nakamoto and Ikeda 2018). Therefore, the
higher the load centrality lj , the more likely it will be for the centrality to be
used for treaty shopping. The load centrality lj of a node j is calculated as
follows:
lj =
∑
o 6=d6=j
wo,d (8)
Here, j, o, and d are nodes (jurisdictions), wo,d is the amount of the dividend
passing through j when a firm located in o sends a dividend to a firm located
in d.
The load centrality li is standardized so that both its average value and
standard deviation are 1.0:
Lj =
lj − lj
σlj
+ 1 (9)
Here, lj is the average of all load centrality lj and σlj is the standard deviation
of all load centrality lj . Therefore, if the standardized load centrality Lj of a
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given jurisdiction j is above 1.0, then it can be said that jurisdiction j has
more possibility to be chosen as the location of conduit firms compared with
other jurisdictions.
2.4 Multilayer centrality
Multilayer centrality Mjs consists of the multilayer outward centrality M
out
js
and the multilayer inward centrality M injs like the conduit centralities cjs. The
multilayer outward centrality Moutjs and the multilayer inward centrality M
in
js
are, respectively, the weighted geometry average of the values of the standard-
ized conduit outward centrality Coutjs and the standardized conduit inward
centrality Cinjs in the ownership network Gα multiplied by the standardized
load centrality Lj in the withholding tax network Gβ . The multilayer out-
ward centrality Moutjs and the multilayer inward centrality M
in
js are defined as
follows:
Moutjs =
α+β
√
(Coutjs )
α · (Lw)β (10)
M injs =
α+β
√
(Cinjs )
α · (Lw)β (11)
Here, α and β determine the ratio to consider the value intensity and the
withholding tax rate to analyze the conduit firms.
To make it easy to compare between jurisdiction × sector pairs, the Eu-
clidean distance between the multilayer outward centrality Moutjs and the mul-
tilayer inward centrality M injs is calculated. The distance is adjusted to 1.0
when the multilayer outward centrality Moutjs and the multilayer inward cen-
trality M injs are both 1.0:
Mjs =
√
(M injs )
2 + (Moutjs )
2/
√
2 (12)
3 Data
We used the Orbis 2015 database (Bureau van Dijk 2015) for the ownership
network Gα. The database comprises shareholding ratio, operating income,
and sector information of about more than 30 million firms across more than
20 jurisdictions. Sectors are defined following the statistical classification of
economic activities in the European community (NACE Rev. 2).
This database is based on information that each firm reported to their lo-
cal Chamber of Commerce. Because each jurisdiction requires different criteria
for the Ministry of Commerce to submit financial statements, data availability
varies greatly depending on jurisdictions. For example, Kosovo includes 99.1%
while Seychelles includes only 0.1%. In particular, it does not include informa-
tion on small-scale firms (Kalemi-Ozan et al. 2015) and information on firms
located in jurisdictions where financial secrets are high. Therefore, our analysis
has a certain bias due to data availability. The shareholding ratio, operating
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income, and sector information are necessary to calculate the value (see Sect.
2.2.1). We removed the nodes vα (firms) that do not have such information
from the ownership network Gα.
The withholding tax rates imposed on dividends that a firm pays to a firm
in other jurisdiction are defined in the domestic laws of each jurisdiction or
the tax treaties concluded between jurisdictions. We used the reduced with-
holding tax rates because the purpose of our analysis is treaty shopping. The
data has been extracted from Ernst & Young (2017), which summarizes such
withholding tax rates, for the withholding tax network Gβ .
4 Results and discussion
At first, 25 jurisdiction × sector pairs are identified as ”sinks.” Next, the
standardized conduit centrality Cjs clarified which jurisdictions × sector pairs
through which more value passes and the standardized load centrality Lj re-
veals which jurisdiction is attractive for treaty shopping. Finally, we calculated
the standardized multilayer centrality Mjs by combining the standardized con-
duit centrality Cjs and the standardized load centrality Lj and found that
firms in certain sectors are often used for treaty shopping. Based on the re-
sult, we suggest countermeasures against treaty shopping to focus on certain
sectors.
4.1 Value intensity
4.1.1 Sink centrality
We calculated standardized sink centrality Sjs for 1,704 jurisdiction × sector
pairs for which data can be obtained. The maximum value of the sink centrality
was 1784.38 and the minimum value of that was -251.82. The value of sink
centrality is wide, but most of the value of the sink centrality is concentrated
in parts. Figure 4 shows its frequency distribution. The sink centrality of 1,598
pairs (about 93.8% of the total pairs) is 1 or less. We can suppose that the
pairs whose standardized sink centrality Sjs is high are very unique and are
likely to function as a sink.
Table 1 shows 25 jurisdiction × sector pairs whose standardized sink cen-
tralities Sjs are higher than 10.0. Nine sectors are represented among the pairs
with the highest sink centrality. Financial and insurance activity (”Finance &
Insurance”) represents more than half of this list and professional, scientific,
and technical activities (”Professional activities etc.”) represents about 1/8 of
this list, showing that much value remains in these sectors. For the calculation
of standardized sink centrality Sjs, we regarded the 25 pairs accounting for
about 1.5% of all pairs as sinks.
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Fig. 4 Frequency distribution of sink centrality Sjs. The sink centrality of most
jurisdictions × sector pairs is less than 1.0. The width of the bins is 81.5.
4.1.2 Conduit outward and inward centrality
The standardized conduit outward centrality Cinjs was calculated for 636 juris-
diction × sector pairs and the standardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs was
calculated for 461 jurisdiction × sector pairs. Finally, we obtained 389 pairs
having both standardized conduit outward centralities Coutjs and standardized
conduit inward centralities Cinjs . The maximum value of the standardized con-
duit outward centrality Coutjs was 19.37 and the minimum value was 0.78. The
maximum value of the standardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs is 10.79
and the minimum value is 0.81. Even though the differences between their
maximum value and their minimum value are not small, both centralities were
distributed in certain parts. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show frequency distribu-
tions of the standardized conduit outward centrality Coutjs and the standardized
conduit inward centrality Cinjs respectively. 608 pairs, accounting for 95.6% of
the total pairs, have standardized conduits outward centrality Coutjs less than
1.0. Similarly, 449 pairs, accounting for 97.4% of the total pairs, have stan-
dardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs less than 1.0. We can suppose that the
pairs whose standardized conduit centrality Cjs is high are very unique and
are likely to function as conduits.
Table 2 shows 15 jurisdiction × sector pairs whose standardized conduit
centrality Cjs is over 2.0. Seven sectors across 13 jurisdictions are represented
among the 15 pairs. Most of the 13 jurisdictions are developed countries and
there are no small island jurisdictions except Bermuda. Wholesale and retail
trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (”Wholesale & Retail trade
etc.”) represents more than 1/4 of this list and Finance & Insurance represents
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Table 1 Jurisdiction × Sector Pairs Where Sink Centrality Sjs is above 10
Jurisdiction Sector Sjs
Malta Finance & Insurance 1784.38
Luxembourg Professional activities etc. 511.86
Luxembourg Administrative & Support service 369.72
Bermuda Construction 134.63
Bermuda Finance & Insurance 87.75
British Virgin Islands Manufacturing 57.03
Cayman Islands Finance & Insurance 39.75
Curacao Finance & Insurance 34.47
France Finance & Insurance 34.10
Marshall Islands Transportation & Storage 30.36
Sweden Finance & Insurance 28.00
British Virgin Islands Wholesale & Retail trade 23.13
Cyprus Finance & Insurance 19.56
Spain Finance & Insurance 19.04
Curacao Wholesale & Retail trade 16.43
UK Mining & Quarrying 16.18
Portugal Finance & Insurance 15.50
Norway Finance & Insurance 14.30
Belgium Finance & Insurance 13.07
the UK Finance & Insurance 12.95
Austria Professional activities etc. 12.71
Iceland Finance & Insurance 12.69
South Africa Manufacturing 10.81
Singapore Other service etc. 10.48
UK Professional activities etc. 10.25
about 1/5 of this list, showing that considerable value, either from or toward
sinks, passes through firms in these sectors.
4.2 Withholding tax rate
We calculated the standardized load centrality Lj for 165 jurisdictions to find
which jurisdictions are likely to be used for treaty shopping. The standardized
load centrality Lj considers all withholding tax liabilities imposed on dividends
made between 165 jurisdictions (27,060 pairs in total). The maximum value
of the standardized load centrality Lj was 7.87 and the minimum value was
0.59. The value of the standardized load centrality Lj is wide, but most of the
value of the standardized load centrality Lj is concentrated in parts. Figure
7 shows its relative frequency distribution. The standardized load centrality
Lj of 147 jurisdictions (about 89.0% of 165 jurisdictions) is 1 or less and the
jurisdictions with high standardized load centralities Lj are limited. We can
suppose that the jurisdictions whose standardized load centrality Lj is high
are likely to be used for treaty shopping.
Table 3 shows jurisdictions whose standardized load centrality Lj is in the
top 15. It is confirmed that focusing on withholding tax rates imposed on
dividends and evaluating jurisdictions by the load centralities lj is meaningful
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Fig. 5 Frequency distribution of the standardized conduit outward centrality
Coutjs . Most of the centralities are less than 1.0. The width of the bins is 1.1.
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Fig. 6 Frequency distribution of the standardized conduit inward centrality Cinjs .
Most of the centralities are less than 1.0. The width of the bins is 1.1.
to the analysis of treaty shopping because the list contains jurisdictions that
multinationals usually use for treaty shopping (Diamond et al. 2017; Nakamoto
and Ikeda 2018). The 15 jurisdictions are scattered around Europe, the Middle
East, East Asia, Africa, and America. European jurisdictions especially have
high standardized load centrality Lj because the withholding tax imposed
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Table 2 Jurisdiction × Sector Pairs Whose Standardized Conduit Centrality Cjs is over
2.0
Jurisdiction Sector Coutjs C
in
js Cjs
The Netherlands Finance & Insurance 19.37 6.13 14.36
Luxembourg Wholesale and Retail trade etc. 6.18 10.79 8.79
Bermuda Mining & Quarrying 1.33 9.49 7.48
Luxembourg Finance & Insurance 6.55 8.08 7.36
Sweden Electricity & Gas supply etc. 9.03 0.91 6.41
Austria Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 3.21 7.87 6.01
Bermuda Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 4.12 7.42 6.00
Portugal Professional activities etc. 6.35 1.24 4.57
Malaysia Manufacturing 5.62 1.03 4.04
Switzerland Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 3.85 0.93 2.80
Germany Manufacturing 3.08 2.19 2.46
UK Administrative & Support services 1.86 2.94 2.46
France Professional activities etc. 3.23 1.05 2.40
Ireland Finance & Insurance 3.12 1.18 2.36
Austria Mining & Quarrying 3.08 0.84 2.26
Austria Manufacturing 2.53 1.61 2.12
Portugal Information & Communication 2.16 1.94 2.05
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Fig. 7 Distribution of standardized load centrality Lj . Most of the centralities are
below 1.0.
on dividends made between EU member states is exempted by the European
Union directive (Directive 90/435/EC).
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Table 3 Jurisdictions Whose Standardized Load Centralities Lj are in the Top 15
Jurisdiction Lj Jurisdiction Lj Jurisdiction Lj
UK 7.87 Singapore 2.94 Saint Lucia 2.46
UAE 6.59 Switzerland 2.93 Bahrain 2.46
Kuwait 5.22 Mauritius 2.91 Malaysia 2.45
The Netherlands 3.44 Spain 2.86 Ireland 2.39
Cyprus 3.11 Luxembourg 2.65 Estonia 2.24
Hong Kong 3.05 Qatar 2.44 Malta 2.21
4.3 Multilayer centrality
The standardized multilayer centrality Mjs can be calculated regarding 389
pairs because the calculation needs both the standardized conduit outward
centrality Coutjs and the standardized conduit inward centrality C
in
js . In addi-
tion, for the calculation of the standardized multilayer centrality Mjs, α and
β need to be set as in Eqs. (10) and (11). α and β determine how much value
intensity and withholding tax rate are considered, respectively. We tried to
find the appropriate value of β by comparing the results obtained by fixing
α to 1.0 and fluctuating β. Table 4 contains the jurisdiction × sector pairs
whose standardized multilayer centrality Mjs is above 2.0 when β is set to
0.8. Many listed pairs are in the United Kingdom and we cannot see the dif-
ference between sectors because the standardized load centrality Lj does not
take the difference of sectors into account. In other words, it shows that setting
β = 0.8 takes too much of the withholding tax rate into consideration. Table
5 shows the pairs whose standardized multilayer centrality Mjs is above 2.0
when β is set to 0.1. The listed pairs include jurisdictions such as Germany
and France, which are unlikely to be used for treaty shopping because these
jurisdictions are not listed in Table 2. There may be another reason (except
treaty shopping) why more value passes through such jurisdictions.
Table 6 shows pairs whose standardized multilayer centrality Mjs is above
2.0 when β is set to 0.5 and includes the jurisdictions well-known as conduits
(Diamond et al. 2017) and, therefore, likely to be used for treaty shopping.
When we set β to 0.3 for our analysis of conduit firms, 179 pairs had standard-
ized multilayer centrality Mjs above 1.0, accounting for 46.02% of total pairs;
48 pairs had standardized multilayer centrality Mjs above 1.5, accounting for
12.34%; and 16 pairs had standardized multilayer centrality Mjs above 2.0,
accounting for 4.11%. Finally, we decided to consider the pairs whose stan-
dardized multilayer centrality Mjs is above 2.0 as the pairs that are likely to
be used for treaty shopping.
The 13 pairs listed in Table 6 include eight sectors across 11 jurisdictions
and Finance & Insurance and Wholesale & Retail trade etc., firms are remark-
able in Table 6 compared with other sectors. This implies that these sectors
have greater potential to be used for treaty shopping. It is possible that treaty
shopping can be prevented by making new tax rules focusing on these sectors.
In addition, no Middle East Asian jurisdictions are ranked highly in the stan-
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Table 4 Jurisdiction × Sector Pairs Whose Standardized Multilayer Centrality Mjs is
above 2.0 (β = 0.8)
Jurisdiction Sector Moutjs M
in
js Mjs
The Netherlands Finance & Insurance 8.98 4.74 7.18
Luxembourg Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 4.24 5.78 5.07
Luxembourg Finance & Insurance 4.38 4.93 4.66
UK Administrative activities etc. 3.53 4.55 4.08
UK Manufacturing 3.13 3.18 3.15
Malaysia Manufacturing 3.89 1.52 2.95
Switzerland Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 3.41 1.55 2.65
UK Information & Communication 2.40 2.44 2.42
UK Electricity & Gas supply etc. 2.37 2.41 2.39
Bermuda Mining & Quarrying 1.01 3.19 2.37
UK Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 2.29 2.42 2.35
Sweden Electricity & Gas supply etc. 3.18 0.89 2.33
Bermuda Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 1.90 2.63 2.29
UK Construction 2.22 2.35 2.29
UK Transportation & Storage 2.23 2.32 2.27
Ireland Finance & Insurance 2.77 1.62 2.27
UK Water supply etc. 2.20 2.30 2.25
UK Other service 2.20 2.30 2.25
UK Real estate activities 2.23 2.25 2.24
UK Arts & Entertainment etc. 2.20 2.28 2.24
UK Public Administration etc. 2.24 2.23 2.24
Singapore Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 2.41 2.05 2.23
UK Human health etc. 2.18 2.24 2.21
UK Accommodation and Food service etc. 2.19 2.24 2.21
UK Education 2.18 2.24 2.21
UK Agriculture etc. 2.18 2.23 2.21
Austria Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 1.60 2.64 2.18
Singapore Manufacturing 1.87 2.44 2.17
Ireland Professional activities etc. 2.40 1.80 2.12
Spain Professional activities etc. 2.07 1.94 2.00
dardized multilayer centrality Mjs, although their standardized load centrali-
ties Lj are ranked highly (see Table 3). Other regulations of the jurisdictions
imposed may cause the results.
At present, the mainstream countermeasures against treaty shopping in-
volve introducing a limitation of benefit clause or a principal purpose test into
tax treaties. The limitation of benefit clause limits firms that can receive the
withholding tax reduction or exemption by certain criteria. On the other hand,
the principal purpose test deprives firms whose main purpose is to enjoy the
reduction or exemption of withholding tax liabilities. Developing countries pre-
fer the principal purpose test because they are easy to enforce compared with
the limitation of benefit clause, whose application criteria are complicated.
On the other hand, the business community is concerned with the principal
purpose test because the test is unclear as to the main purpose and tends to
prefer the limitation of benefit clause whose application criteria are clearer.
Our analysis shows that some sectors, such as Manufacturing, Wholesale
& Retail trade etc., Professional activities etc., are likely to be used for treaty
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Table 5 Jurisdiction × Sector Pairs Whose Standardized Multilayer Centrality Mjs is
above 2.0 (β = 0.1)
Jurisdiction Sector Moutjs M
in
js Mjs
The Netherlands Finance & Insurance 13.00 5.37 9.94
Luxembourg Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 5.08 7.81 6.59
Luxembourg Finance & Insurance 5.32 6.25 5.80
Bermuda Mining & Quarrying 1.16 5.65 4.08
Sweden Electricity & Gas supply etc. 5.25 0.90 3.77
Bermuda Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 2.75 4.33 3.63
Austria Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 2.24 4.46 2.20
Malaysia Manufacturing 4.64 1.26 3.40
UK Administrative & Support service 2.60 3.69 3.19
Switzerland Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 3.62 1.21 2.70
Portugal Professional activities etc. 3.66 1.04 2.69
Ireland Financial & Insurance 2.93 1.39 2.29
UK Manufacturing 2.20 2.24 2.22
Germany Manufacturing 2.43 1.87 2.17
France Professional activities etc. 2.72 1.14 2.08
Ireland Professional activities etc. 2.41 1.61 2.05
Singapore Wholesale & Retail trade etc. 2.23 1.78 2.02
Table 6 Jurisdiction × Sector Pairs Whose Standardized Multilayer Centrality Mjs is
above 2.0 (β = 0.5)
Jurisdiction Sector Moutjs M
in
js Mjs
The Netherlands Finance & Insurance 10.88 5.06 8.49
Luxembourg Wholesale & Retail trade 4.66 6.76 5.81
Luxembourg Finance & Insurance 4.85 5.57 5.22
UK Administrative & Support services 3.01 4.08 3.59
Malaysia Manufacturing 4.26 1.38 3.17
Bermuda Mining & Quarrying 1.09 4.30 3.13
Sweden Electricity & Gas supply etc. 4.13 0.89 2.99
Bermuda Wholesale & Retail trade 2.30 3.41 2.91
Austria Wholesale & Retail trade 1.90 3.46 2.80
Switzerland Wholesale & Retail trade 3.52 1.36 2.67
UK Manufacturing 2.60 2.65 2.63
Ireland Finance & Insurance 2.85 1.49 2.28
Singapore Manufacturing 1.71 2.35 2.05
shopping. We think that it is effective for preventing treaty shopping to focus
on such sectors as Controlled Foreign Company rules of some jurisdictions,
which is a countermeasure against another scheme of international tax avoid-
ance, already focused on sectors. The introduction of rules focusing on some
sectors may not only prevent treaty shopping effectively but also reduce the
complexity of application criteria developing countries are concerned with and
improve taxpayer predictability.
The size of each jurisdictions in Figure 8 indicates the size of the standard-
ized multilayer centrality Mjs regarding Finance & Insurance and Wholesale
& Retail trade etc., respectively. It should be noted that jurisdictions with
high standardized multilayer centrality Mjs are limited. Figure 8 (a) indicates
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the standardized multilayer centrality Mjs of Finance & Insurance and shows
that the centrality of The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and other financial cen-
ters such as the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Hong Kong, and Mauritius is high.
Figure 8 (b) indicates the standardized multilayer centrality Mjs of Wholesale
& retail trade etc., and shows that the centrality of the jurisdictions of Europe
and South East Asia is high. We suggest that the new clauses focusing on cer-
tain sectors are introduced to tax treaties already concluded with jurisdictions
having high standardized multilayer centrality Mjs.
(a) Finance & Insurance
(b) Wholesale & Retail trade etc.
Fig. 8 Cartogram of multilayer centralities Mjs. The size of each jurisdiction indicates
the degree of multilayer centrality Mjs.
Developing countries conclude tax treaties with developed countries to in-
crease investment from developed countries. With globalization of economy,
the number of tax treaties has increased and about 1,000 tax treaties are re-
lated to developing countries among about 4,000 tax treaties in the world. It
should be noted that tax treaties not only increase foreign direct investment
from developed countries, but also increase the possibility of treaty shopping
and the loss of their own tax sources.
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5 Conclusion
Developing countries have mainly relied on assistance from developed countries
to reduce poverty, but they are now required to carry out their own develop-
ment through their own tax revenues. International tax avoidance is one of
the reasons why developing countries cannot earn tax revenues compared with
developed countries. Even though there are various ways to conduct interna-
tional tax avoidance, treaty shopping is focused on in this paper due to tax
revenues of developing countries. To analyze the location and sector of conduit
firms that are likely to be used for treaty shopping, we constructed the multi-
layer ownership-tax network and proposed the multilayer centrality. Because
multilayer centrality can consider not only the value flowing in the ownership
network but also the withholding tax rate, it is expected to grasp precisely
the locations and the sectors of conduit firms established for the purpose of
treaty shopping. The results of our analysis suggest that firms in the sectors of
Finance & Insurance and Wholesale & Retail trade etc. may be conduit firms
that plays an important role in treaty shopping. Therefore, we suggest that to
prevent treaty shopping, developing countries should introduce a clause focus-
ing on certain sectors in their tax treaty, especially with developed countries
with high multilayer centrality. This is because the countermeasures to treaty
shopping that focus on some sectors is not complicated, developing countries
find it easier to use them, and the predictability of taxpayers is not harmed
much. A further quantitative study of treaty shopping is needed that takes not
only withholding tax but also corporate tax into consideration. Such findings
would contribute to our understanding of the effects of treaty shopping toward
each jurisdiction’s tax revenue.
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